

# **RESEARCH PROPOSAL**

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The general aim of my dissertation is both to investigate and justify the idea that the nature of truth ought to be significantly founded on the sole notion of evidence.

The dissertation starts introducing the philosophical topic of the theories of truth in general and then it focuses more and more on recent developments of epistemic theories of truth based on evidence. Nevertheless every chapter is developed as a sort of independent essay where some critical analysis and conclusion is provided. The final chapter contains the most innovative ideas, and originates in agreement with the conclusions of the previous chapters.

Many examples are examined.

## **Chapters**

1. The major theories of truth
2. Evidence and time for truth and belief in epistemology
3. Pragmatist and verificationist theories of truth
4. Dummett's verificationism and Putnam's internal realism
5. Axiomatic theories of truth
6. Indexicality, vagueness and context
7. Recent developments of epistemic theories of truth
8. Morals and proposal

## **- Sources -**

### **Chapter 1: The major theories of truth**

Correspondence: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Tarski

Coherence: Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Neurath, Hempel, Bradley

Social constructivism: Vico, Hegel, Gramsci, Marx, Foucault, M. Stirner, Nietzsche

Consensus: Habermas

Pragmatism: Peirce, James, Dewey

Pluralism: Wright, Lynch, Grayling

Performative theory: Strawson

Redundancy: Ramsey

Deflationary: Frege, Tarski, Quine, Horwich

Relativism: sophists, Crick, Feyerabend, Kuhn, Margolis

## **Chapter 2: Evidence and time for truth and belief in epistemology**

Evidentialism: Conee, Feldman, Mittag

Reliabilism: A. Goldman, M. Swain, Plantinga, Beebe

Temporalism/eternalism: Brogaard, Fitch, Jackman

## **Chapter 3: Pragmatist and verificationist theories of truth**

Peirce, James, Dewey, Carnap, Ayer, C.I. Lewis, Quine, Dummett, van Fraassen, Putnam, Peacocke

## **Chapter 4: Dummett's verificationism and Putnam's internal realism**

Dummett, Putnam

## **Chapter 5: Formal theories of truth**

Tarski, Gödel, Kripke, Horsten, Halbach, Leitgeb, Field

## **Chapter 6: Indexicality, vagueness and context**

S. Cohen, Williamson, Machina, Williams, N.J.J. Smith

## **Chapter 7: Recent developments of theories of truth concerning on evidence**

Williamson, Sauerland, Stateva, Gross, Barker, Egré, Comesaña, Hendricks

## **Chapter 8: Morals and proposal**

The general thesis I want to defend has some similarities to the one stated by René Descartes (in Discourse on the Method, III, 4):

'It is truth very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to follow what is most probable.'

And as Brand Blanshard said: 'But the whole difficulty arises from the fact that we do not and often cannot [know what is true and what is false]. What is to guide us then?... The ideal is believe no more, but also no less, than what the evidence warrants.'

The normal way in which people use the term 'true' is related to the subjective side of the truth: the certainty, the 'full' belief. Moreover, I argue that a notion of truth that couldn't be grounded on the beliefs would be irrelevant.

In the previous chapters I show how truth could more properly be expressed by the degrees of truth; degrees of truth ought then to be based on the degrees of belief (and not viceversa – this is an essential difference with the two previous quotes). More precisely, degrees of truth ought to be (right) conclusive degrees of belief. I defend the view that the rightness of the conclusiveness is ideally given by the exhaustion of the referred evidence and of the set of the testing theories.

Finally, it is not too controversial the thesis that the degrees of belief ought to be based on the evidence, through some (right) verification. In turn, such a verification would be right if it ideally appeals only to the evidence.

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