Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p
Grunbaum:
As I have asserted again and again in previous publications, p.
Putnam:
Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the fallacies in this "argument". (It's really awful, isn't it?) Therefore p.
Rawls:
It would be nice to have a deductive argument that p from self-evident premises. Unfortunately I am unable to provide one. So I will have to rest content with the following intuitive considerations in its support: p.
Unger:
Suppose it were the case that not-p. It would follow from this that someone knows that q. But on my view, no one knows anything whatsoever. Therefore p. (Unger believes that the louder you say this argument, the more persuasive it becomes).
Katz:
I have seventeen arguments for the claim that p, and I know of only four for the claim that not-p. Therefore p.
Lewis:
Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious and when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the fact that they find not-p obvious is no argument that it is true; and I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare. Therefore, p.
Fodor:
My argument for p is based on three premises:
q
r
p
From these, the claim that p deductively follows.
Some people may find the third premise controversial, but it is clear that if we replaced that premise by any other reasonable premise, the argument would go through just as well.
Sellars:
Unfortunately limitations of space prevent it from being included here, but important parts of the proof can be found in each of the articles in the attached bibliography.
Earman:
There are solutions to the field equations of general relativity in which space-time has the structure of a four- dimensional Klein bottle and in which there is no matter. In each such space-time, the claim that not-p is false. Therefore p.
Goodman:
Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false, on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so- called "counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that p in a way that it was obviously not intended -- for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Therefore p.
Saul Kripke:
Some philosophers have argued that not-p. But none of them seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case. Therefore, p.
Routley and Meyer:
If (q & not-q) is true, then there is a model for p. Therefore p.
Plantinga:
It is a model theorem that p -> p. Surely its possible that p must be true. Thus p. But it is a model theorem that p -> p. Therefore p.
Chisholm:
P-ness is self-presenting. Therefore, p.
Morganbesser:
If not p, what? q maybe?
Anselm:
I can entertain an idea of the most perfect state of affairs inconsistent with not-p. If this state of affairs does not obtain then it is less than perfect, for an obtaining state of affairs is better than a non-obtaining one; so the state of affairs inconsistent with not-p obtains; therefore it is proved, etc.
Churchland:
Certain of my opponents claim to think that not-p; but it is precisely my thesis that they do not. Therefore p.
Feyerabend:
The theory p, though "refuted" by the anomaly q and a thousand others, may nevertheless be adhered to by a scientist for any length of time; and "rationally" adhered to. For
did not the most "absurd" of theories, heliocentrism, stage a come-back after two thousand years? And is not Voodoo now emerging from a long period of unmerited
neglect?
Goldman:
Several critics have put forward purported "counterexamples" to my thesis that p; but all of these critics have understood my thesis in a way that was clearly not intended,
since I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Therefore p.
Plato:
SOCRATES: Is it not true that p?
GLAUCON: I agree.
CEPHALUS: It would seem so.
POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily.
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, Socrates.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.
PAUSANIAS: Quite so, if we are to be consistent.
ARISTOPHANES: Assuredly.
ERYXIMACHUS: The argument certainly points that way.
PHAEDO: By all means.
PHAEDRUS: What you say is true, Socrates.
Smart:
Dammit all! p.
Stove:
While everyone knows deep down that p, some philosophers feel curiously compelled to assert that not-p, as a result of being closet Marxists. I shall label this phenomenon
"the blithering idiot effect". As I have shown that all assertions of not-p by anyone worth speaking of, and several by people who aren't, are due to the blithering idiot effect,
there remains no reason to deny p, which everyone knows deep down anyway. I won't even waste my time arguing for it any further.
